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ABSTRACT
Since the global financial crisis, there is a massive shift of assets towards index
funds. Rather than picking stocks, index funds replicate stock indices such as the
S&P 500. But where do these indices actually come from? This paper analyzes the
politico-economic role of index providers, a small group of highly profitable firms
including MSCI, S&P DJI, and FTSE Russell, and develops a research agenda from an
IPE perspective. We argue that these index providers have become actors that exer-
cise growing private authority as they steer investments through the indices they
create and maintain. While technical expertise is a precondition, their brand is the
primary source of index provider authority, which is entrenched through network
externalities. Rather than a purely technical exercise, constructing indices is inher-
ently political. Which companies or countries are included into an index or excluded
(i.e. receive investment in- or outflows) is based on criteria defined by index pro-
viders, thereby setting standards for corporate governance and investor access.
Hence, in this new age of passive asset management index providers are becoming
gatekeepers that exert de facto regulatory power and thus may have important
effects on corporate governance and the economic policies of countries.
KEYWORDS
private authority; index providers; stock market indices; passive asset management; index funds;
capital flows
Introduction
The period after the global financial crisis has been characterized as the ‘age of
asset management’ (Haldane, 2014) as banks bore the brunt of new international
regulation and asset managers consequently emerged as more important than ever
before. However, it is not asset management in general that is burgeoning in this
new post-crisis era. Actively managed funds where (highly paid) managers pick
stocks with the aim of ‘beating’ the market are declining, while ‘passive’ investing
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is growing rapidly. Through index mutual funds and exchange traded funds
(ETFs), both of which carry extremely low fees for investors, passive asset manag-
ers replicate established stock market indices such as the S&P 500, the FTSE 100 or
the MSCI World. This fundamental shift in investor behavior towards passive strat-
egies has pronounced implications for corporate governance, corporate power, and
market competition (Azar, Schmalz & Tecu, 2018; Braun, 2016; Elhauge, 2016;
Fichtner, Heemskerk & Garcia-Bernardo, 2017; Haberly, MacDonald-Korth, Urban
& Wojcik, 2019; Jahnke, 2019b). We add to this growing literature by showing how
the rise of passive investing has put index providers into a new position of private
authority in global capital markets. Today, index providers’ decisions have a signifi-
cant impact on global investment flows and corporate governance standards. We
therefore develop a research agenda on this new role of index providers from an
international political economy (IPE) perspective.
Index mutual funds have been available since the late 1970s and the first ETFs
have been launched in the early 1990s. However, investors shunned them for a long
time. But after the global financial crisis growth of index funds has accelerated mas-
sively. From 2006 to 2018 almost US$3,200 billion have flown out of actively man-
aged equity funds globally, while over US$3,100 billion have flown into index equity
funds (Sushko & Turner, 2018; Henderson, 2019). This constitutes an unprecedented
money mass-migration from active to passive funds, which is rational as most
actively managed funds are unable to beat broad market indices over longer time
periods but charge high fees. In mid-2019, the assets of US equity index funds have
surpassed active funds (Gittelsohn, 2019). Hence, we have entered the age of passive
asset management. One crucial, yet largely unstudied element of this new era is that
index funds effectively delegate their investment decisions to index providers. Index
providers are the firms that create and maintain the indices on which passive funds
rely and to which asset managers have to pay fees if they use them.
Similar to passive asset management, which is dominated by the ‘Big Three’ of
BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street (Fichtner et al., 2017), the global index pro-
vider industry is very concentrated. Just three firms, MSCI, S&P Dow Jones Indices
(DJI) and FTSE Russell, hold a combined market share of almost 80% (Burton-
Taylor, 2018). While global index revenues totaled a record US$2.7 billion in 2017,
their profit margins that stand out as exceptionally high. MSCI reports an operat-
ing margin of over 60% for its index segment in 2018 (MSCI, 2019). This suggests
that index providers operate in an oligopolistic industry, which has high barriers to
competition. Figure 1 shows the growth of index providers in the dawning age of
passive investing. Both MSCI and FTSE (excluding Russell) doubled their revenues
from 2006 to 2010. From 2010 to 2017 FTSE and S&P DJI increased their revenues
by over 150%. Hence, during the last decade the big index providers have had
much higher growth than most other financial companies, especially banks.
Wigglesworth (2019b) emphasizes that ‘financial indices are arguably the most
under-appreciated force shaping global markets’. Remarkably, however, as
Rauterberg and Verstein (2013, p. 105) note, scholars ‘have largely ignored the
indispensable role indices play in markets’ – notwithstanding some important work
by finance and law scholars (Rauterberg & Verstein, 2013; Robertson, 2019a,
2019b). We aim to fill this void through a first analysis of index providers from an
IPE perspective. We argue that index providers today occupy a position of growing
private authority, with decision-making and standard-setting capabilities that are
2 J. PETRY ET AL.
consequential in the global political economy. In the past, their indices primarily
served informational purposes. An index such as the S&P 500 or the Nikkei was
primarily a numerical representation of a particular stock market. Indices served as
benchmarks against which analysts could gauge the performance of stocks. While
the decisions of index providers had some impact on actively managed funds, the
rise of passive investing transformed their role in a significant way. Today, they de
facto steer capital with their indices as inclusions of firms or countries to an
index can lead to inflows of billions of US$ while exclusions can cause large quasi-
automatic outflows. Constructing indices is therefore not a purely technical exer-
cise. Index providers have significant discretion in devising their methodologies.
Robertson (2019b), for instance, finds that the methodology of the pivotal S&P 500
index was changed at least eight times between 2015 and 2018. Underlying their
seemingly technical exercise are decisional discretion and normative assumptions
about ‘good’ corporate governance and ‘free’ markets. Index providers therefore
play a role as standard-setters: their notions on what constitutes good corporate
governance at the level of the firm and a favorable investment environment at the
level of (national) markets helps or hinders firms and countries in attracting cap-
ital, essentially deciding what is investment-worthy in global financial markets.
This combination of standard-setting and legitimate decision-making power means
that index providers have gained a position of private authority in capital markets
with profound politico-economic consequences.
Two anecdotal examples illustrate how the ongoing shift from active to passive
investing has positioned index providers as crucial actors in capital markets. In
2018, the Anglo-Dutch company Unilever abandoned its planned shift to one single
headquarter in the Netherlands after an investor revolt. As a simplification of the
governance and share structure, one headquarter was believed to be in the interest
of shareholders. But Unilever’s management did not fully appreciate the increased
importance of indices. Leaving Britain would have meant exiting the FTSE 100
because of its index methodology. Investors opposed this as they would have been
forced to sell the stock, index funds because they directly track the FTSE 100 and
Figure 1. Revenues of the three big index providers (2010¼ 100).
Source: Orbis and annual reports.
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active funds because they are benchmarked against this key British index (Wood,
2018). Thus, in the age of passive investing membership in a benchmark index
takes strategic precedence over other shareholder interests. A second example illus-
trates how index providers have become relevant actors in the global political econ-
omy. In 2015, the finance minister of Peru hurriedly travelled to New York
because of rumors that MSCI might downgrade the country from its flagship
‘emerging markets’ stock index to ‘frontier’ status (Alloway, Burger, & Evans,
2017). Eventually Peru managed to escape this fate by changing financial market
regulations and engaging in ‘roadshows with institutional investors to identify what
were the necessary measures to strengthen liquidity and implement them’ (Doll,
2019). Today index providers have become important counterparts for states.
In what follows we develop the argument that index providers increasingly are
to equity markets what credit rating agencies are to bond markets, crucial
‘coordination service firms’ that exercise private authority and effectively set stand-
ards for the behavior of other firms and even countries (see Cutler, Haufler, &
Porter, 1999; N€olke & Perry, 2007). Their new authority was not delegated from
the public sphere, but gradually emerged as part of a transformation of the index
provider industry – from primarily supplying information about markets to becom-
ing private authorities that are able to set standards on corporate governance and
steer international capital flows. Take for example FTSE Russell, S&P DJI and
MSCI’s emerging market indices; the index providers’ recent decision to include
countries such as China and Saudi Arabia to their indices is expected to result in a
‘seismic shift’ of over US$120 billion in active and passive fund flows by 2020
(Robertson & Lam, 2019).
We analyze this development and what it means for the international political
economy using secondary literature, financial news and index methodologies, as
well as 13 expert interviews with index providers, exchanges and asset managers
conducted between July 2017 and September 2019 which we use for background
information and direct quotes.1 Section one reviews the existing literature on pri-
vate authority in order to conceptualize the role of indices and index providers in
global finance. Section two and three discuss the changing role of index providers
from information providers to authoritative actors in the age of passive asset man-
agement. Sections four and five discuss the implications of this transformation by
examining the standard-setting role that index providers perform for the corporate
governance of listed firms as well as for states through steering capital flows. The
final section concludes by developing a research agenda on index providers.
Indices, index providers, and private authority
In essence, indices are numerical tools that enable the comparative evaluation of
groups of assets over time. The purpose of indices is to display the performance of
a specific economic entity such as a nation’s stock market (S&P 500) or the rate at
which banks offer to lend to each other (LIBOR) in one single number that is rela-
tively easy to understand and comparable over time. As such they consist of a ser-
ies of corresponding dates and numbers, evaluations based on a series of assets
(e.g. stock prices) with specific weightings, whose sequence depicts the performance
of the evaluated assets (Robertson, 2019a). Thereby, indices demarcate the
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boundaries of what these entities are: the 500 companies that the S&P 500 evaluates
are (perceived as being) synonymous with the US stock market.
Political economy research on such financial market indices is limited and
mostly focused on LIBOR, often dubbed ‘the world’s most important number’,
which attracted a lot of attention after it became clear that banks had colluded to
manipulate it (Stenfors & Lindo, 2018). Others have focused on the emergence of
the ABX index in subprime-mortgage markets (MacKenzie, 2012) or the creation
of index-based financial derivatives (Millo, 2007). Some scholars have focused on
emerging market bond indices (Blustein, 2006; Hardie, 2006; Santiso, 2003).
Blustein (2006) emphasized how index calculations can create ‘perverse’ incentives
as index weightings are determined by existing levels of debt. Santiso (2003) out-
lined the importance of indices in emerging market investing, emphasizing how
indices act as ‘prisms’ through which fund managers view the investible world.
In contrast to a focus on the impact of bond indices on emerging markets, we
focus on index providers as actors who create indices for stock markets. Financial
market indices are important measures for economic activity and have become a
constant feature of our depiction of and thinking about the economy (Fioramonti,
2014). As Rauterberg and Verstein (2013, p. 115) note:
[There] is a myth of objectivity, which characterizes indices as near-Platonic mathematical
constructs that exist largely outside of human intervention and creativity. [… ] According
to this view, indices are either themselves objective facts or else factual statements about
the world. For example, that the S&P 500 is above 1000 is an observable, objective truth
and one that does not rely on human judgment or interpretation.
But financial market indices are far from objective. The ‘veneer of numerical
representation’ (Broome & Quirk, 2015a, p. 829) conceals the normative values and
assumptions underlying their calculation. They represent ‘deliberate decisions’
made by index providers as every index is a managed portfolio whose composition
is decided by the respective index provider (Robertson, 2019a). Thus, while these
simplified numerical representations might seem objective and technical, they are
actually based on complex and (often contested) normative values. Moreover, proc-
esses of index production are inherently subjective activities, ‘[as] human discretion
and value judgement are essential ingredients in even the most “objective” indices’
(Rauterberg & Verstein, 2013, p. 101). As B€uthe & Mattli (2011, p. 11) stress,
standard-setting is always political.
The political underpinnings of numerical tools such as indices, indicators and
benchmarks have received growing attention (Broome & Quirk, 2015a, 2015b;
Cooley & Snyder, 2015). This emerging literature underscores how indices and indi-
cators have a governing effect on those that are being evaluated, incentivizing the
individuals, companies or states that are being assessed to comply with the norms
underlying those numerical representations, as better performance has positive idea-
tional and material effects, enabling a form of ‘governance from a distance’ (Broome
& Quirk, 2015a). The most prominent example of such numerical evaluation meas-
ures in global finance are credit rating agencies which can shift the asset allocation
of billions of US$ by up- or downgrading firms and countries (Campbell-Verduyn,
2017; Lake, 2010; Sinclair, 2005). Similarly, by deciding what to include into/exclude
from an index and how to calculate these, index providers make assessments about
the investment-worthiness of firms and countries and can thereby move investment
flows. We argue that index providers play an important role in equity markets as
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they increasingly define ‘the norms of what’s considered acceptable in international
finance’ (Alloway et al., 2017). Arguably, in this new age of passive asset manage-
ment index providers are to equity markets what credit rating agencies are to bond
markets – critical gatekeepers that exert de facto regulatory power.
For these numerical representations to be able to exert governing effects the
actors producing them must enjoy a certain degree of authority. We follow Cutler
et al. (1999, p. 5, 13) who define actors with private authority as ‘when an [non-
governmental] individual or organization has decision-making power over a par-
ticular issue area and is regarded as exercising that power legitimately’ and who
‘develop and enforce binding obligations [… ] often for [an] industry as a whole’.
A useful distinction is between actors that are ‘in authority’ such as state officials
or private actors who receive delegated authority and those that are ‘an authority’:
a position derived from their positioning as experts within a given social structure
(Lincoln, 1994; Sinclair, 2005). Index providers, we argue, are ‘an authority’ and
their relevant social structure is the international investment community. In IPE a
literature has developed on the emergence of authority beyond the public realm
(Cutler et al., 1999; Hall & Biersteker, 2002; Kahler & Lake, 2003; see B€uthe 2004,
2010 for overviews). This literature has analyzed the interplay between public and
private authorities as well as the emergence of private authority through the retreat
of the state, which provided a space for private actors such as firms to exercise
authority (Cutler et al., 1999).2 We are particularly interested in the growing pri-
vate authority that index providers now have in the investment community, and
furthermore how they have grown into such a position of private authority. This
leaves aside other – obviously relevant – questions such as the public regulation of
index providers. We come back to these issues in our concluding research agenda.
In what follows we seek to establish the source(s) of their legitimacy and authority.
As Lake (2010) notes, private authority is inherently relational, produced and
reproduced through ongoing interactions between the authority and non-authorities,
where the formers’ decisions are considered as legitimate by the latter (see also
B€uthe, 2010). Rather than coercion or self-interest, legitimacy is a ‘normative belief
by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed’ and is based on how the
authority is ‘perceived’ by non-authoritarian actors (Hurd, 1999, p. 381).
We see three conditions for index provider authority. First of all, technical
expertise to construct an index is a necessary – but not sufficient – condition for
their authority. As one interviewee noted, ‘everyone needs quality, [… ] the calcula-
tions need to be correct’ (Interview 9). However, mere expertise is not enough.
Only because companies create an index does not mean that this numerical evalu-
ation is authoritative or that they become ‘an authority’. While there are many
index providers, only the decisions of three index providers really move markets:
MSCI, FTSE Russell and S&P DJI. This is because of the second condition; crucial
for index provider authority is their brand recognition, or more specifically the
trust that the international investment community puts in their brands. As Cohen
(1998, p. 145) notes, ‘authority is socially constructed’ and is ultimately based on
trust, which in turn is based on reputation (see Aykens, 2005) – and this reputation
is embodied by each of the three big index providers’ brands. Like the brand of
one of the large credit rating agencies, ‘all it has is an intangible reputation for
good judgment’ (Sinclair, 2019, p. 11). It is their brand why investors follow the
major index providers’ decisions, and which makes these so consequential. As
6 J. PETRY ET AL.
several interviewees noted, the big three index providers are ‘brand managers’
(Interviews 9-10), and: ‘at the end of the day, those products are homogeneous and
exchangeable. It’s like water, there are small differences why Evian is more expen-
sive [… ]. Those are minimal differences, but the price tags are very different!
[… ] MSCI is famous for being expensive – not because they have better data or
indices, but because they are the brand that is most used in the world [… ] Brand
is everything!’ (Interview 7). Another interviewee adds, ‘the brands matter: it’s like
drinking Coca-Cola, you could drink Dr. Pepper or Pepsi-Cola, but [investors] pre-
fer Coca-Cola’ (Interview 10). While intellectual property rights do not apply to
index methodologies, index provider ‘brand names’ are protected (Interviews 9,
11). Like rating agencies, their brands give the large index providers ‘a hold on col-
lective thinking’ (Sinclair, 2019, p. 11) that other index providers do not enjoy.
A third condition that underpins index provider authority lies in a set of net-
work externalities that reinforce the authority of the major index providers. As first
movers they have in effect ‘captured’ different national (e.g. S&P 500 or FTSE 100)
and regional (Euro Stoxx 50) market segments with their indices (Interviews 10, 12).
There is no need for dozens of numerical representations of an economic entity,
because liquidity tends to concentrate in only a few products (Interview 11).
Moreover, investors have created performance track records with these established
benchmarks, which makes it difficult to switch to new ones (Blustein, 2006). The glo-
bal coverage or ‘index families’, of major index providers allow investors to compare
market developments globally (Interview 7, 9); and large futures markets were built
on their benchmarks that increase liquidity and provide risk management tools for
these indices (Interview 11-12). These network externalities entrench the authority
that leading index providers derive from their brands. With these three conditions in
place, index providers have become private authorities in financial markets.
Notably, authority is not static but dynamic (Campbell-Verduyn, 2017), as spe-
cific (historical) circumstances shape the relationship in which certain actors can
gain authority over others (Lincoln, 1994). Sinclair (2005) highlights that the
authority of rating agencies developed within and was enabled by changing socio-
economic structures, i.e. the growth of capital markets and the decline of banks as
allocators of credit, which created a demand for rating agencies’ services for the
functioning of the then disintermediated structure of finance. Therefore, ‘authority
is best understood as an effect of these circumstances, rather than as an entity or a
characteristic of an actor or institution’ and ‘its existence is therefore not func-
tional, [… ] but always contingent on time, place, and circumstance’ (Sinclair 2005,
p. 64). In the following sections we substantiate how the authority of index pro-
viders has shifted from minimal and relatively insignificant to sizable and conse-
quential. Historically, they were primarily providers of information. But with the
ongoing shift towards passive asset management, index providers became de facto
market authorities because their brands – i.e. their indices – became central build-
ing blocks for the functioning of index funds. As a result, their decision-making
capabilities on index composition have direct effects on steering capital flows.
The naissance of the index provider industry
Initially, index providers were part of the financial media complex. While their
expertise was already developing, they were no authorities in capital markets but
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part of the machinery that provided information for investors – indices were ‘a
news item’ (Interview 12). They were helpful but arguably not essential for invest-
ment decisions. Indices were published in newspapers to provide investors with
information about the American post-civil war railroad boom. Charles Dow who in
1896 developed the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the world’s first financial market
index, also created The Wall Street Journal. Similarly, the Financial Times created
indices for the London stock market since 1935 and the Japanese Nikkei newspaper
for the Tokyo market since 1949. The predecessor of the S&P 500 was created by
the Standard Statistics Company (now Standard & Poor’s) in 1923. Standard &
Poor’s was acquired by publisher McGraw-Hill in 1966, underscoring the strong
links of the index business with (financial) media.
Next to newspapers, exchanges entered the index business, which seemed only
natural as it was their data that was used to calculate indices. While some
exchanges such as Nasdaq (in 1985) created their own indices, most other success-
ful indices were created in collaboration with newspapers. FTSE started as a joint
venture between the Financial Times (F-T) and the London Stock Exchange (S-E)
in 1995, Stoxx began as a joint venture between Dow Jones & Company, Deutsche
B€orse and the Swiss Stock Exchange in 1997, and CME Group Index Services was
a joint venture between CME and Dow Jones. Russell started creating indices in
1984 as benchmarks to evaluate the performance of fund managers, and Capital
International began creating indices for non-US equity markets, which were
licensed by Morgan Stanley in 1986 under the name Morgan Stanley Capital
International (MSCI) Indices. In 1998, MSCI was established as a joint venture
between Morgan Stanley and Capital International.
Originally, indices were calculated daily or weekly and published in newspa-
pers to inform about market movements. This process was accelerated with the
advent of modern information technology that led to the digitization of markets
and index providers started calculating indices in real time. Indices were soon
displayed on stock exchanges’ trading floors, daily news reporting was con-
ducted in front of these charts, and indices became synonymous with ‘the mar-
ket’. With the shift in global finance from banks to capital markets indices
became more relevant as information tools tracking the development of financial
markets (Campbell-Verduyn, 2017). First, this led to the emergence of a few
indices as recognized benchmarks by those index providers that had positioned
themselves to ‘provide the right concept at the right time for the market’
(Interview 10). Second, investors wanted to compare performance between mar-
kets in a transparent and trustworthy manner. This gave rise to globally com-
parable indices for instance by MSCI, which ‘investors really like because you
can separate the globe into individual, comparable pieces’ (Interview 7). Further,
in the 1980s exchanges such as CME and LIFFE started launching index futures
and options, gradually increasing their importance as reference prices for under-
lying assets (Millo, 2007).
In the era of active investing indices were ‘helpful’ but not ‘essential’ to the
functioning of financial markets. A few index providers enjoyed considerable brand
recognition, some indices were synonymous to the markets they aimed to repre-
sent, and index futures enabled risk management for those markets. Moreover,
many actively managed funds used them as baselines to compare their perform-
ance. Therefore, indices had at least some influence on asset managers as any
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deviation from the relevant index could be conceived as a kind of risk management
metric.3 However, indices only loosely anchored the asset allocation as most fund
managers had the discretion to choose both the degree of replicating the index as
well as the time period for doing so. As one interviewee noted, back then ‘the
propagated characteristic of active management was to be different from the index
[… ] to beat the index’ (Interview 9). Hence, the decision-making power of index
providers over the composition of their indices had relatively limited impact as it
intermediated capital flows very indirectly. Thus, at that time, the main function of
indices was to provide market information (see Figure 2); their exact composition
was not yet crucial to investors, listed companies or countries. This changed funda-
mentally with the rise of passive investing in the mid-2000s. Index providers began
to influence capital flows in an immediate and comprehensive way. Being a central
component of the index funds ecosystem conferred them – gradually and only as a
side-effect of their business model – a position of growing private authority in
financial markets.
From supplying information to exerting authority
The financial crisis triggered two reinforcing trends that transformed index pro-
viders from merely supplying information to exerting authority.4 First, the global
index industry concentrated. MSCI was listed to become an independent entity,
while Russell was acquired by LSE in 2014 which merged it with FTSE whose
remaining stake LSE had acquired from publisher Pearson in 2011, forming FTSE
Russell. And S&P DJI was created in 2012 through the merger of DJI and S&P
Indices, owned by S&P Global (73%) and CME Group (27%). In addition, these
top three index providers acquired various smaller index, data and analytics com-
panies, consolidating their leading industry position (Interview 11). By 2017, S&P
DJI, MSCI and FTSE Russell each accounted for about 26% of global index indus-
try revenues. Together with Stoxx and Nasdaq which both hold a 5% share, they
have a market share of almost 90% (Burton-Taylor, 2018). This market
Figure 2. The role of index providers before the shift to passive investing.
Note: Dotted lines represent non-monetary relations; solid lines constitute monetary flows.
Source: Own illustration.
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concentration arguably led to a growing power position of the few index providers
that had historically positioned themselves in financial markets.
The second and more consequential trend was the money mass-migration
towards passive investments, which significantly increased the nascent authority
of index providers as evermore funds directly tracked their indices. Whereas in
the past indices only loosely anchored fund holdings around a baseline, now they
had an instant, ‘mechanic’ effect on the holdings of passive funds, ‘steering’ cap-
ital flows. Increasingly, investments were not actively managed by fund managers
but passively invested into index mutual funds and ETFs (Braun, 2016; Fichtner
et al., 2017; Haberly et al., 2019; Jahnke, 2019b). This makes sense as the vast
majority of actively managed funds have not been able to beat benchmark indices
over longer periods of time, while charging substantially higher fees than index
funds (SPIVA, 2019). In order to track the performance of ‘the market’, passively
managed funds replicate stock market indices such as the S&P 500 or the MSCI
World. Rather than trying to generate ‘alpha’ and outperform the market by pick-
ing stocks, these passively managed funds aim to generate ‘beta’, simply replicat-
ing the performance of specific stock markets while minimizing fees. Figure 3
shows the development of assets indexed to indices from the big three index pro-
viders, both for ETFs (scale left hand side) and non-ETF index funds (scale right
hand side). ETFs indexed to MSCI indices increased more than fivefold between
2008 and 2017, from US$132 billion to US$744 billion. Similarly, ETF assets
tracking FTSE Russell indices doubled from 2013 to 2017. From 2011 to 2017
assets indexed to S&P DJI indices quintupled from US$274 billion to US$1,344
billion, while non-ETF assets (mainly Vanguard US index mutual funds)
increased from US$1,456 billion to a staggering US$3,500 billion. Notably, passive
investing is further advanced in equities than in bonds as equities are much more
standardized and liquid. However, in recent years passive investment is also pour-
ing into bonds and in mid-2019 fixed-income ETFs have reached US$1 trillion
(Loder, 2019).
Figure 3. Passive funds tracking the three big index providers (bn US$).
Source: Company websites and annual reports.
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By investing in an index, passive investors delegate decision-making about
where to invest to index providers. Index investing thus represents a form of
‘delegated management’ and every discretionary decision by index providers has a
‘flow through effect on the investor’s portfolio’ (Robertson, 2019a, p. 843). As
Howard Marks of Oaktree Capital stated: ‘somebody is making very active deci-
sions about which stocks will be in each “passive” product. [… ] the people who
create the indices are deciding which stocks will be invested in’ (Alloway et al.,
2017). Index providers steer these giant passive investment capital flows. But index
providers have a steering effect over active managed funds as well. Established and
well-known indices are increasingly used as direct benchmarks by actively managed
funds which measure their performance against these indices, and which thus are
crucial as investment baselines. Benchmarking against indices has reached enor-
mous proportions: US$14.8 trillion, US$16 trillion and US$8.9 trillion of assets
(equities and bonds) was benchmarked against the indices of MSCI, FTSE Russell
and S&P DJI in 2017/18, respectively. This is up from US$7 trillion (MSCI),
US$7.1 trillion (S&P DJI) and US$7.1 trillion (FTSE & Russell) in 2013. Moreover,
there is a substantial proportion of equity funds that officially are actively managed
funds (and therefore charge higher fees than index funds) but actually do not devi-
ate much from their benchmark indices. This is referred to as ‘closet indexing’ or
‘index hugging’, and it is estimated that in the EU between 5-15% of all equity
funds could fall into this category (ESMA, 2016). Therefore, the rise of passive
management also increases the authority of index providers vis-a-vis active man-
agement because by steering evermore passive capital index decisions now mechan-
ically move ever larger parts of the markets, creating a ‘pull effect’ that actively
managed funds need to follow (Interview 9). This means that not only passive
funds shift their investment according to reclassifications by index providers, but
also active funds that are benchmarked against established indices.
The degree to which types of institutional investors delegate their investment
decisions to index providers varies. Table 1 shows this variation across two differ-
ent dimensions: the degree of index replication and the time period for doing so.
Hedge funds and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) generally have low degrees of rep-
licating indices (one exception is the Norwegian SWF, which almost invests like a
global ESG5 index fund) and are fully discretionary to follow any index modifica-
tion. Many actively managed mutual funds replicate their benchmark indices to a
certain degree, and some will likely follow if the index constituents change. In
other words, for them the index acts as a loose anchor from which they will not
totally deviate but which they will also not fully and immediately follow. Closet
index funds are shown for the sake of completeness; they approximate passive
funds but charge higher fees. Finally, ETFs and index mutual funds fully replicate
the tracked index and generally do so immediately.6 This absolute reproduction of
Table 1. Relationship between index providers and types of investors.
Type of investor
Hedge funds,
sovereign wealth
funds, others
Actively managed
mutual funds Closet index funds
ETFs and index
mutual funds
Degree of index
replication
Very low
to medium
Medium to high Almost full Full
Time period of
following index
Discretionary Medium Medium
to immediate
Immediate
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the asset allocation as decided by index providers – what we call steering capital –
is the crucial difference to actively managed mutual funds. And, we argue, this is a
qualitatively new development that necessitates research on the kind of authority
that index providers wield.
In sum, with the ongoing shift from active to passive investing, index providers
have become a vital component of the overall index funds ecosystem. From their
previous role as information providers for capital markets they have become central
cornerstones of passive asset management and thereby gained a position of private
authority. Figure 4 illustrates the central role of index providers in the age of pas-
sive investing. The starting point for the transition towards private authority of
index providers is that they own key indices such as the FTSE 100 or the MSCI
Emerging Markets Index, which are well-known brands to investors. These brands
are the basis of their authority. When investors buy index funds via passive asset
managers they effectively delegate their investment decision to them. Through sub-
sequent in- or exclusions of companies or countries index providers are effectively
steering capital. Or, in the words of Authers (2018): ‘Indices no longer merely
measure markets. They move them.’ This role as critical gatekeepers that decide
the criteria for index membership confers MSCI, S&P DJI and FTSE Russell with
growing private authority as they set the standards that firms and states have to
follow if they seek inclusion in key indices.
So far, we underscored the de facto delegation of investment decisions to index
providers. However, it is obvious that index providers have limited degrees of free-
dom when it comes to index creation. Ultimately, their indices need to be consid-
ered by the investment community as valid and legitimate constructs. First and
foremost, index providers are in the business of licensing their indices. They sell
their brand to investors, and their brand gives legitimacy to investments. As one
interviewee noted, ‘they help customers to generate assets through [their] brands’
(Interview 9). While previously index providers simply created a few widely tracked
benchmarks, they are doing much more today; as Ken O’Keefe of FTSE Russell
noted: ‘We sit down with ETF providers. They’re looking for something that is
Figure 4. The role of index providers after the shift to passive investing.
Note: Dotted lines represent non-monetary relations; solid lines constitute monetary flows.
Source: Own illustration.
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going to better meet the needs for financial advisors, and they’re turning to us for
help in designing that’ (Chen, 2019). This also explains the proliferation of indices
of which there are now far more than stocks, as many new indices exist to essen-
tially ‘repackage active investment strategies’ (Bloomberg, 2017).7 Far from simply
providing information on ‘the market’, index providers now offer a variety of cus-
tomized branded products, by either tweaking existing benchmarks or repackaging
proprietary trading strategies into indices which enable the functioning of (passive)
asset management capitalism (Interviews 8-12). Hence, index providers naturally
emphasize their focus on clients. In the words of Henry Fernandez, CEO of MSCI:
‘We are trying to marry the needs of suppliers of capital and the consumers of cap-
ital. If we don’t do that well then it will become very apparent very quickly’
(Wigglesworth, 2019a). Index providers therefore regularly consult with asset man-
agers about changes in their indices (Interviews 9-13). However, it is clear who
takes the final decision: ‘Index providers want to have the last word, in order to
preserve their independence’ (Moreolo, 2018). Index providers are thus basically
paid by passive asset managers for making decisions about which companies and
states are investment-worthy. And the more investments are passively allocated, the
more consequential their decision-making power that they have through the calcu-
lation of their indices.
The relationship between index providers and asset managers is intriguing. On
the one hand, asset managers depend on the large index providers to create their
products that are attractive to investors. On the other hand, they have an interest
to reduce the fees they have to pay for using indices. In theory, there are two ways
for competition to emerge in the index industry: through new index providers and
through self-indexing by asset managers. However, both have so far not been able
to break the oligopolistic market structure. New index providers, such as the
German firm Solactive, are often small firms that do not have the crucial ‘market
recognition’ (Interview 5). They do not have the big index providers’ brands and
historic legacy, so they have to compete on price (Interview 9). Either they come
up with an idea that established index providers have not come up with yet, ‘then
at some point [the big index providers] will make an offer that you cannot refuse’,
or they ‘do what the big index providers do not want to do’ (Interview 11), i.e.
offer ‘unbranded’ low-cost solutions. Second, asset managers that might have brand
recognition (e.g. BlackRock’s iShares) are plagued by potential conflicts of interest
that would make others question the quality of their index decisions – compromis-
ing the necessary condition of index provider authority that they need trust in their
expertise to create indices.
It is further difficult for challenger indices to gain benchmark status as network
externalities entrench the authority of the big index providers. Investors have exist-
ing track records with established benchmarks and huge derivative markets use
these benchmarks as underlyings, which enables risk management and increases
liquidity. As discussed, liquidity is often concentrated in a few benchmarks
(Interview 10). Furthermore, the major index providers have accumulated a lot of
data and acquired related businesses (e.g. MSCI’s acquisitions of Barra and
RiskMetrics), that makes it very difficult and costly to switch (Interviews 9-11). All
of that creates a ‘virtuous circle’ for the big index providers that thus benefit from
‘a historical legacy for providing the right concept at the right time for the market’
(Interview 10). Therefore, while some competition in the index industry exists,
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‘catching up organically is impossible’ (Interview 11) and newcomers do not have
‘the brand, the history and the assets attached to that’ (Interview 9) – the condi-
tions which provide the established index providers with the authority to
move markets.
Consequently, the large index providers have become private authorities that
move markets. This movement of markets works in two related but different ways.
First, index providers have an increased authority as standard-setters in corporate
governance. Even when they adhere to minimal standards for firm inclusion into
their indices, their influence is considerable. This kind of standard-setting authority
is especially pronounced in the developed markets of Europe and North America.
Second, their decision-making power is even more consequential when we consider
emerging markets. Index providers not only decide to include particular firms, they
also make decisions on in- and exclusions of entire markets, steering capital with
important politico-economic implications for states.
Setting standards: promoting ‘good’ corporate governance?
In the age of passive investing, indices – and therefore index providers – are
becoming more important for listed firms and their corporate governance. In
recent years, investors, companies and the press have begun to notice the large
influence that index providers have with defining their methodologies. But while
many indices are strictly rule-based and thus only influence companies indirectly,
some indices – including the S&P 500, the world’s most-tracked index – have com-
mittees that make discretionary, less rule-based decisions (Robertson, 2019b). In
2008, the committee decided to leave the troubled insurance giant AIG in the S&P
500 even though it violated the requirement that member companies need a public
float of at least 50% after AIG’s bail-out by the US Treasury, because of fear that
‘dropping AIG would have sent the markets tumbling yet again’ (Blitzer, 2014).
Then, in 2019, the decades-old rule of a 50% minimum public float was scrapped
with the effect that T-Mobile US, 63% owned by Deutsche Telekom, joined the
S&P 500 (Bary, 2019); presumably the aim was to increase the representativity of
the index (Interview 9). So, while the majority of inclusions is rather mechanical
and influence is indirect, it is not uncommon that index decisions target individual
firms to set a ‘precedence’ on a particular issue that then gets incorporated into
existing methodologies (Interviews 9-10). One such example is Snap Inc., which
wanted to publicly offer shares without any voting rights. After protest by institu-
tional investors the big three index providers initiated a consultation process and
eventually announced that at least 5% voting rights have to be offered to public
shareholders for a company to qualify for index membership (Hall, Kaplan & Polk,
2017). In addition, S&P DJI and FTSE Russell decided that they will exclude firms
that have multiple types of shares with disparate voting rights. FTSE Russell (2017,
p. 6) used relatively strong words in its voting rights consultation: ‘The proposal
set out here effectively draws a principled line in the sand.’ However, the low value
of 5% shows that the index provider pursues a cautious approach. Moreover, the
exclusion of companies that have very unequal classes of stock does not pertain to
existing well-known index members such as Alphabet (i.e. Google), Berkshire
Hathaway or Facebook (Jahnke, 2019a).
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Another aspect that demonstrates the far-reaching yet hidden politico-economic
consequences of index methodology is that members of the S&P 500 – the index
that like no other epitomizes the American stock market – are allowed to be legally
based outside the US in a few selected ‘domiciles of convenience’ (S&P DJI, 2019).
These domiciles include jurisdictions that have been identified as ‘sink’ offshore
financial centers (OFCs), such as Bermuda, the Cayman Islands and Jersey, which
provide low or zero taxation and a high degree of secrecy as well as ‘conduit’
OFCs, such as Ireland and Switzerland (Garcia-Bernardo, Fichtner, Takes, &
Heemskerk, 2017). Currently 20 members of the S&P 500 make use of this clause.
Hence, in this way S&P DJI could in effect be enabling and legitimizing aggressive
tax planning and potentially even tax evasion by multinational corporations.
There are also other ways in which index methodologies have subtle yet lasting
effects on companies and the different political economies they are based in. For
example, in 2000 MSCI, DJI and FTSE changed the calculation of their indices to
weighting member companies based on their ‘free float’ rather than on their total
market capitalization, which means excluding the shares of large strategic block-
holders. This readjustment was estimated to have moved billions out of Japan and
other Asian countries, while liberal market economies such as the UK received
inflows (Santiso, 2003). This method, however, penalizes firms that have long-term
blockholders, which could be companies in which the state holds significant owner-
ship (France) or corporations in which founding families hold large blockholdings
(Germany). It induces an incentive for listed companies to reduce long-term block-
holders, thus facilitating institutional change in these political economies (see Deeg,
2009; Fichtner, 2015). Moreover, it has become standard practice for the majority
of key global stock indices to use only the market capitalization of firms for calcu-
lating the weight of companies. Market capitalization primarily derives from the
(future) profits of corporations. Even though that has changed somewhat in the
last decades, profit maximization is still not the exclusive goal of corporations from
countries such as France, Germany and Japan. Passive asset managers (e.g.
BlackRock), even when quasi-permanently holding large ownership positions, are
not excluded from the calculation, however.
How should we think about the influence that index providers now have in the
area of corporate governance? The historical raison d’^etre of index providers was
to provide accurate representations of stock markets (Interview 10). Therefore,
among the top objectives of index providers is to maximize the representativity of
their indices and to minimize turnover of index constituents. Mark Makepeace of
FTSE Russell stated: ‘We’re not activists. We’re setting the minimum standards
that investors generally will accept, and our role is to build consensus amongst that
investor community as to what that minimum standard should be’ (Alloway et al.,
2017). Hirst & Kastiel (2019, pp. 14-15) have characterized index providers as
‘reluctant regulators’ that, because of their business model, have a ‘structural incen-
tive to follow the preferences of investors’, which leads them to prefer broad cover-
age of their indices – arguably this makes index exclusions a ‘nuclear option, to be
reserved for extreme situations’. The three big index providers are therefore best
seen as consensus-building agents that aggregate their own interests with those of
asset managers from developed economies, i.e. mainly from Anglo-
American countries.
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Whereas in the past indices primarily had an informational purpose, the rise of
index investing has conferred a growing influence on index providers because of
their central position in the index funds ecosystem. Index providers have become
de facto private standard-setters over corporate governance. Currently, they seem
to be ‘reluctant regulators’ that only do the minimum. In contrast to rating agen-
cies which assess individual companies, the power of index providers over individ-
ual firms varies. Thus, more research about the scope and the limits of index
provider authority with respect to individual companies is needed.
Steering capital: promoting ‘free’ and accessible markets?
Perhaps the most significant consequence of recent changes in the index provider
industry from an IPE perspective is that they have become influential private actors
vis-a-vis states, especially emerging economies. While indices are comprised of the
stocks of individual companies, each of these companies is listed on an exchange,
which is situated within a country that creates the rules and regulatory frameworks
for its national stock market. These rules that states decide upon, however, do not
necessarily match the preferences of index providers. A large literature exists on the
role of (international) investors and their power versus states (e.g. Babic, Fichtner, &
Heemskerk, 2017; Bortz & Kaltenbrunner, 2018). We argue that in the age of passive
investing this power is partially transferred to index providers as they decide over
capital inflows/outflows through inclusions/exclusions. This is especially relevant for
emerging economies as financial markets are organized hierarchically and emerging
countries bear the brunt of skittish investor behavior (Kaltenbrunner, 2018). The
dynamics of this process are changing, however. Through index investing the active
investment decision to enter or exit markets has been delegated to index providers
and their seemingly ‘technical’ criteria; as one index provider noted ‘we look at coun-
try classification just as a mechanical tool to access markets’ (Interview 12). By
reclassifying individual countries, index providers effectively redraw the borders of
markets. Index providers set out the criteria that decide which countries are
‘investment-worthy’, thereby defining this very hierarchy.
For developing countries, on the other hand, being part of an index is important
as international investors invest billions of US$ into their ‘under-developed’ stock
markets, not only funding their domestically listed companies but also raising their
international profile. Index inclusion is an accolade for countries as the inclusion
signifies and establishes the international investment community’s trust into their
economy (Interview 12). As one interviewee (Interview 10) noted: ‘Obviously for
any economy the no.1 aspiration for a government is to create the economic condi-
tions to attract foreign investments. [… ] So being included in a broad index is
essential.’ But as argued above, seemingly objective index calculation is based upon
normative assumptions about the nature of markets, which should be freely access-
ible for international investors. By setting out these criteria, index providers shape
the norms of global finance. Index providers decide whether to include countries
into their indices and whether to classify them as ‘frontier’, ‘emerging’ or
‘developed’ markets.8 By additionally putting countries on watchlists for such inclu-
sions, exclusions or reclassifications, index providers create incentives for states to
comply with their rules. As one interviewee put it: ‘the big index providers, they
are setting standards! [… ] Before, nobody paid attention, but now so much money
follows them, [… ] they have a lot of political power!’ (Interview 5).
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While S&P DJI is the world’s largest index provider by revenue, this is mainly
due to the crucial S&P 500 index. In contrast, MSCI is the largest provider for
emerging markets equity indices (Miyajima & Shim, 2014). In the words of the
Financial Times, ‘MSCI [… ] in effect controls the definition of which countries
are “emerging markets”’ (Authers, 2018).9 Therefore, MSCI’s criteria for inclusion/
exclusion are crucial for emerging markets. MSCI’s CEO even states that ‘there’s
not a country that doesn’t call as soon as a review is announced’ (Wigglesworth,
2019a). These criteria are set out in MSCI’s Market Classification Framework, com-
prising three elements: economic development; size and liquidity; and investor
access. Economic development is not crucial as a criterion, neither are the size and
liquidity requirements (only 2-5 companies need to meet minimum requirements).
Investor access is the dealmaker/breaker for country classifications, and it is on this
that most indexing decisions are based (Interview 13).
As MSCI (2018a, p. 2) states, the criterion of market accessibility ‘aims to reflect
international institutional investors’ experience of investing in a given market’, and its
assessment is ‘based on qualitative measures’ that MSCI reviews for all markets at
least once a year during its Global Market Accessibility Review. This provides MSCI
with a great degree of discretion and ‘ample space for subjective judgement on
whether certain countries should be considered frontier or emerging markets’
(Moreolo, 2018); the same applies for their weighting within indices. While index
decisions about company inclusions are often more indirect and not targeted at indi-
vidual companies, in the case of country reclassifications index providers take a much
more proactive role (Interviews 9-10). As the following cases demonstrate, these deci-
sions have enormous consequences for states and their national stock markets.
In June 2017, MSCI decided to (gradually) include China A-Shares into its
MSCI Emerging Market indices which are tracked by funds worth US$1.8 trillion,
followed by FTSE Russell in 2018. In early 2019, MSCI announced to quadruple
the weight of Chinese A-shares to 20%. It is estimated that the inclusion will bring
at least US$80 billion of passive and active investment into the Chinese market, an
enormously prestigious decision for China that shows increased recognition from
the international investment community; one expert (Interview 3) likened it to
‘basically China’s ascent into the Champions League’. Long-term foreign inflows
into Chinese stocks are estimated at US$400 billion over the next decade (He,
2018). However, China’s index inclusion was a quite contested, political process.
Many observers suggested that Chinese regulators had to make concessions, with
the main issue being guaranteed investor access to China’s relatively closed market.
As one interviewee noted, ‘MSCI have actually accomplished quite a lot by the
inclusion. It’s amazing that it was an external, private organization that suddenly
gets CSRC [China Securities Regulatory Commission] and government officials to
bend and to agree to things that they would never would have agreed to in any
other circumstances’ (Interview 6). As another interviewee highlighted, MSCI has a
quasi-regulatory function – ‘even though MSCI is not a regulator, companies need
to abide, to respect their rules’ (Interview 4). Since the inclusion, MSCI for instance
delisted several Chinese companies that suspended the trading of their shares as
this violated market accessibility (Interview 13). Over the years, MSCI has been in
close contact with the Chinese counterparts, advising regulators on how to regulate
markets to meet inclusion requirements or informing Chinese companies about
MSCI corporate governance standards (Interviews 4, 6, 13). Other observers,
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however, voiced concerns that the inclusion was a result of pressure from the
Chinese government and the promise of rising profits for MSCI through increased
access to China (Bird, 2019). In any case, China’s inclusion into MSCI indices was
not a neutral technical exercise but a highly political process with a significant
impact on the global allocation of financial assets that requires further
investigation.
Few states have the power to contest index providers, with China and the US as
possible exceptions to the rule. Most countries need to comply with their rules due
to their integration into global financial circuits. India for instance came to be in a
much tighter spot in a recent dispute with MSCI. In February 2018, three Indian
stock exchanges terminated market data agreements with MSCI, meaning that they
would no longer provide data for the creation of indices or derivative products that
would be traded outside of India (BSE, NSE, & MSEI, 2018). This move came after
increasing fears in India about losing control over capital markets as derivatives
business moved to the Singapore Exchange (SGX) where Nifty index futures (the
Indian equivalent of the S&P 500) are traded. However, MSCI (2018c) condemned
the termination of the market data agreement as an ‘unprecedented’, ‘anti-competi-
tive’ behavior because under its Market Classification Framework, ‘anti-competitive
measures restricting investors’ access to derived stock exchange information receive
a negative score in the Competitive Landscape category’; it further ‘strongly sug-
gested’ that the Indian exchanges and regulator ‘reconsider [their move] before it
leads to any unnecessary disruptions in trading or a potential change in the market
classification of the Indian market in the MSCI Indexes’ (MSCI, 2018c). MSCI
effectively threatened India with an exclusion, a subsequent loss of status and
investment outflows. At the time of writing, SGX and NSE are cooperating to
maintain international investor access by routing SGX trades through GIFT City,
India’s new international financial center (Coutinho, 2019). This case again high-
lights the inherently political nature of indexing and country classifications, and
the power that index providers have over steering capital flows.
Korea, Brazil and Turkey are also on MSCI’s ‘watchlist’ of countries that could
be downgraded if they do not ease investor access (MSCI, 2018b; Tan &
Robertson, 2018), highlighting the needs to comply with the rulebook drafted by
index providers. In order to affect classifications, countries ‘have homework to do’
and ‘boxes to tick’ (Interview 9) – simply talking with index providers is not suffi-
cient, ‘they really need to make effective changes’ (Interview 13). The index reclas-
sification of emerging countries is expected to result in a ‘seismic shift’ of over
US$120 billion in active and passive fund flows in 2019 alone (Robertson & Lam,
2019). Hence, in the age of passive investing the reclassification of countries into
‘developed,’ ‘emerging,’ and ‘frontier’ markets can lead to billions of rapid
‘automatic’ in- or outflows by funds that track the respective indices. With the
move towards passive investing, the locus of agency between international investors
and governments has therefore shifted. As this section argued, the actions and
judgements of index providers can have important consequences for states.
Conclusion: a research agenda for index providers
This paper provides the first IPE analysis of index providers, highlighting their
changing politico-economic role in the age of passive asset management. We argue
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that with the shift towards passive investing, the three big index providers have
become actors that exercise growing private authority in capital markets as they
steer investments through the indices they create and maintain. Index providers
define the criteria according to which companies or countries are included into an
index. Thereby, they influence investment decisions and corporate governance
norms as well as strategies of those companies and states (that seek to be) included
into their indices. We argue that rather than technical expertise, the main source of
authority are their powerful brands that are trusted by the international investment
community and which are entrenched via network externalities. Given the continu-
ous shift towards passive investment, the dominant position of the three big index
providers will most likely persist in the coming years and merits further research.
In the remainder of this conclusion we thus develop a research agenda from an
IPE perspective.
We see three main research avenues: the first is index providers themselves,
including their decision-making processes and their embeddedness in the index
funds ecosystem. It would be essential to further open up the ‘black box’ of how
the big three index providers make decisions, which includes the interaction with
their most important client group and stakeholder – the investor community. We
argue that to a certain extent index providers act as consensus-building agents for
the asset management industry. But how exactly do they weigh the interests of dif-
ferent investors, especially those of the big three passive asset managers BlackRock,
Vanguard, and State Street? To what extent do they reflect a minimum consensus
of the asset management industry or rather go beyond such a consensus and initi-
ate reforms? We have identified the powerful brands of the three large index pro-
viders as a major source of their authority. But further research is required how
persistent these brands are, and how precisely competition works in this concen-
trated industry. Can we speak of a global oligopoly or is it rather a series of
national/regional and segment quasi-monopolies as in most countries there are
usually only one or two indices in which invested assets are concentrated and
which, therefore, are most liquid. This also warrants a closer exploration of the
financial infrastructures into which index providers are embedded such as market
data, analytics and derivative markets and how they relate to the increasing infra-
structural power of finance (see Bernards & Campbell-Verduyn, 2019; Braun,
2018). Next to stock markets, the role of index providers in bond markets should
be studied. While the shift to passive investment is not as pronounced there yet,
other mechanisms might be at play and a comparison to their role in stock markets
might provide further insights about the sources of index authority across asset
classes. A broad interview-based study would be well-suited to tackle these ques-
tions. In addition, a comprehensive survey of asset managers would be useful to
study the brand and the legitimacy of the big index providers (see B€uthe & Mattli,
2011). Such research would enable a more nuanced understanding of the growing
private authority exerted by index providers, including its limits.
Furthermore, it would be instructive to systematically compare the three big
index providers with the dominant rating agencies to identify more precisely simi-
larities and differences in the sources of their authority, how they exercise it and
influence global finance. Another field of study is the (emerging) regulation of
indices and index providers. In the case of credit rating agencies, regulation only
entrenched their roles as market authorities (Sinclair, 2005). Especially since the
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LIBOR-scandal, indices have also become subject to regulation through the EU
Benchmarking Regulation or the IOSCO Principles for Financial Benchmarks. This
poses questions about how these regulations will affect the highly concentrated
index industry and about the role of index providers in those regulatory processes.
The second area of research is the influence of index providers and their index
methodologies on the corporate governance of listed corporations. As consensus-
building agents for the (mainly Anglo-American) investor community, the big
index providers seem likely to adhere to minimum standards as they seek their
indices to have high representativity. Nonetheless, we think that their role as de
facto standard-setters will receive increasing attention in coming years, by invest-
ors, regulators and the public. A necessary first step would be to systematically ana-
lyze how the methodologies of the big index providers have changed in recent
decades. Such an analysis could potentially uncover a hierarchy between the three
big index providers, for instance whether MSCI often acted as a first-mover con-
cerning important changes in index methodology. Furthermore, an analysis of
index methodologies should focus on how they influence corporate governance
standards, including their potential enabling of tax avoidance by allowing member
companies to be legally based in ‘domiciles of convenience’. The role of index pro-
viders in relation to green finance and climate change is also a topic that needs to
be investigated as their brand-recognition and standard-setting capacities extend
into evaluative practices such as ESG (environmental, social and governance) crite-
ria, a fast-growing business segment. As index providers increasingly define what is
‘investment-worthy’, they could arguably also play an important role in setting
standards for the definition of as well as steering capital towards ‘sustainable’
investments.
The third avenue of research is how the private authority of three big index pro-
viders affects states, particularly emerging markets. This focus is especially relevant
from an IPE perspective. We have identified investor access as the most important
criterion in the methodology of emerging markets equity indices. Therefore, the
impact of country (re-)classifications on financial market regulations should be
analyzed more closely. Mixed methods approaches that combine quantitative analy-
ses with interview-based case studies of individual countries should ascertain if
there is a correlation between the financial openness of emerging markets and their
position in index categories and/or watchlists. Such an approach could also offer
important insights into the specific causal mechanisms at play and help to better
understand the ‘steering capital’ effect of index authority in equity markets.
Complementary research should be conducted on the role of growing bond indices
for emerging markets, as they directly influence sovereign debt. Especially in the con-
text of a comparative capitalisms framework it might be worthwhile investigating the
impact that index providers have on countries’ financial regulations, because it seems
likely that index providers tend to spread standards from liberal market economies,
where most of the investor community is based. One particular case that deserves
close attention is the inclusion of China in key global equity and bond indices, as
this will be the largest instance of steering capital in the foreseeable future. In this
age of passive asset management, index providers ‘have become finance’s new king-
makers: arbiters of how investors should allocate their money’, in the words of The
Economist (2017). Recognizing their new role as private authorities is crucial to
understanding the ongoing transformation of global finance.
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List of interviews
1. Managing director of index provider in Hong Kong (6 July 2017).
2. Business development unit of exchange in London (11 October 2017).
3. FX trading desk of bank in Frankfurt (25 January 2018).
4. International department of exchange in Shanghai (26 April 2018).
5. Business development unit of index provider in Hong Kong (27 September 2018).
6. General manager of exchange in Hong Kong (27 September 2018).
7. Business development unit of exchange in Hong Kong; telephone (19 August 2019).
8. Former asset manager in New York; telephone (19 August 2019).
9. Head of research of index provider in Frankfurt (20 August 2019).
10. Senior managing director at index provider in Zurich; telephone (23 August 2019).
11. Strategy department of index provider in Frankfurt (29 August 2019).
12. Senior managing director at index provider in London (3 September 2019).
13. Research department at index provider in Shanghai (23 September 2019).
Notes
1. When several interviews confirmed statements or mentioned specific aspects, they are
referenced without direct quotes, e.g. (Interviews 7-9).
2. Others have highlighted different dimensions of private authority, such as the moral
authority of religious movements (Hall & Biersteker, 2002) or have distinguished
private authority from technical authority (Porter, 2005).
3. We thank a reviewer for suggesting this point.
4. Interviews 7-11 and 13 confirmed the financial crisis as a tipping point.
5. ESG funds exclude firms because of environmental, social and governance criteria.
6. Index funds that track indices, which comprise illiquid constituents (i.e. bond ETFs)
often use sampling strategies, whereas most equity index funds use full replication.
7. Importantly, while the number of indices has skyrocketed, they are created by the
same small group of index providers.
8. Country classification schemes are relatively similar: MSCI and S&P DJI (Frontier;
Emerging; Developed) and FTSE (Frontier; Secondary Emerging; Advanced Emerging;
Developed) (FTSE, 2019; MSCI, 2018a; S&P DJI, 2018).
9. Also confirmed in Interviews 5, 8-10.
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